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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE COALITION OF
SENIOR CITIZENS, et al.
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
vs.
Case No. 20152
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants seek an award of attorneys1 fees for their
participation in a case before the Public Service Commission
of Utah based

on Section

122 (a) of the Public Utility

Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"), 16 U.S.C. § 2632.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable David B. Dee, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied
Appellants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.

NATURE OF RELIEF REQUESTED
Respondent

requests

that

the

affirmed.

- 1-

judgment

below

be

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts as stated by Appellants are basically correct.

However, the following additional comments regarding

the background of the proceedings before the Public Service
Commission and the participation of various parties in those
proceedings are relevant.
During 1977, the Public Service Commission initiated
administrative

rulemaking

procedures

to

consider

the

adoption of the Utah Residential Utility Service Regulations
("URUSR").

(Transcript before the Public Service Commission

[hereafter

Tr.]

at

4-5).

The

Commission

subsequently

adopted the URUSR. (Tr. at 5).
On November 9, 1978, Congress enacted PURPA.

Section

113 of PURPA required each state regulatory authority, not
later than two years after the enactment of PURPAf to
provide public notice and conduct a hearing to consider the
adoption of various PURPA standards, including a standard
for termination of service.
(b) (4) .

16 U.S.C. § 2623

(a) and

Section 113 also required each state regulatory

authority to adopt, within the same two-year period, each
PURPA standard or to state in writing the reasons why it
declined to adopt each standard.

16 U.S.C.

2623(c).

Section 116 of PURPA required each state regulatory
authority to file with the Secretary of Energy, not later

-

? -

than

November

9,

1979, a

report

which

summarized

the

determinations made and the actions taken with respect to
each

PURPA

standard.

16

U.S.C.

2626(a).

The

Public

Service Commission filed the required report and stated in
that report that it felt its rules were in general compliance with the standards, but that "further issues on the
termination problem were being considered at a later date."
(Tr. at 228-229) .
Appellants filed their petition on November 26, 1979.
The Public Service Commission set the petition for hearing
and expanded the scope of the hearing to include consideration of the PURPA standard for termination of service.
(R. at 2, 11). During the hearings before the Commission,
four electric
utilities,

the

utilities
Committee

(including
of

Respondent), two gas

Consumer

Services

and

the

Division of Public Utilities entered appearances through
their respective counsel.

(Tr. at 1, 2, 197).

The Committee of Consumer Services was represented by
Assistant Attorney General James Barker.
present

during

the

course

of

the

Mr. Barker was

hearings

and

he

participated in those hearings; including raising objections
to

the

introduction

of

testimony

presented

by

utility

witnesses (Tr. at 154, 357-359), assisting a public witness
in presenting testimony (Tr. at 237) and engaging in cross
examination of witnesses.

(Tr. at 3, 3A, 198, 339).

The Division of Public Utilities was represented by
Assistant Attorney General Craig Rich. Mr. Rich was present
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during the course of the hearings and he assisted the staff
witnesses of the Division in presenting their testimony and
exhibits to the Commission.

(Tr. at 3, 3A, 198, 339; Index

August 25 Tr.; Index August 13 Tr.).
in cross examination of witnesses.

Mr. Rich also engaged

(Tr. at 3, 3A, 198, 339;

Index August 25 Tr.; Index August 13 Tr.)

ARGUMENT
A.

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERVENOR
COMPENSATION UNDER THE PROVISIONS
OF PURPA HAVE NOT BEEN MET,
THEREBY PRECLUDING AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

Section 122 (a) of PURPA provides for intervenor compensation only if each of several conditions is satisfied:
First, "no alternative means" under § 122(b) must otherwise
be available for assuring the representation of electric
consumers; second, the electric consumer must have, by its
participation, "substantially contributed" to the approval
of a position advocated by it in a proceeding relating to
the adoption of standards set forth in subtitle B of PURPA;
and third, the electric consumer must demonstrate that it
represents an interest which, absent an award of compensation, would otherwise be unable to participate in the
proceeding.

In order to obtain compensation, an intervenor

must show that all of these conditions have been satisfied.

- 4-

1. THE STATE OF UTAH HAS PROVIDED "ALTERNATIVE MEANS" FOR
ASSURING THE REPRESENTATION OF ELECTRIC CONSUMERS
IN THE FORM OF THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
AND THE COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES AND
THOSE AGENCIES "ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED"
THE INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC,
Since

the

State

of

Utah

has

provided

"alternative

means" to assure the representation of electric consumers f
Appellants necessarily fail at the outset to satisfy all the
conditions

for

intervenor

compensation.

Section

122

PURPA reads as follows:
Section 122.
(a)

CONSUMER REPRESENTATION

COMPENSATION FOR COSTS OF
PARTICIPATION OR INTERVENTION

(1) ^I_f no alternative means for assuring
representation of electric consumers is adopted in
accordance with subsection (b) and if an electric
consumer of an electric utility
substantially
contributed to the approval, in whole or in part,
of a position advocated by such consumer in a
proceeding concerning such utility, and relating
to any standard set forth in Subtitle B, such
utility shall be liable to compensate such consumer (pursuant to paragraph (2)) for reasonable
attorneys 1 fees, expert witness fees, and other
reasonable
costs
incurred
in preparation
and
advocacy of such position in such proceeding
(including fees and costs of obtaining judicial
review of any determination made in such proceeding with respect to such position).
(2) A consumer entitled to fees and costs
under paragraph
(1) may collect such fees and
costs from an electric utility by bringing a civil
action in any state court of competent jurisdiction, unless the state regulatory authority (in
the case of a proceeding concerning a state
regulated electric utility), . . .has adopted a
reasonable
procedure
pursuant
to
which
such
authority or nonregulated electric utility —
(A)

determines the amount of such fees
and costs, and

- 5 -

of

(B)

includes an award of such fees and
costs
in
its
order
in
the
proceeding.

[(a)(3) omitted]
(b) ALTERNATIVE MEANS.
Compensation shall
not be required under subsection (a) if the State,
the State regulatory authority (in the case of a
proceeding concerning a State regulated electric
utility), . . . has provided an alternative means
for providing adequate compensation to persons —
(1)

who
have,
interest—

or

represent,

an

(A) which would not otherwise be
adequately
represented
in
the
proceeding, and
(B)

(2)

representation
of
which
is
necessary for a fair determination in the proceeding,
and

who are, or represent an interest
which
is
unable
to
effectively
participate or intervene
in the
proceeding
because
such
persons
cannot afford to pay
reasonable
attorneys 1
fees,
expert
witness
fees, and other reasonable costs of
preparing for, and participating or
intervening
in,
such
proceeding
(including
fees
and
costs
of
obtaining judicial review of such
proceeding).
[ (c) - (e) omitted]

[Emphasis supplied]; 16 U.S.C. § 2632(a), (b).
The legislative history of § 122 of PURPA makes clear
that an "adequately funded office of public counsel" is one
example of an alternative means of assuring

representation

of electric consumers:

Section 122 is a modified version of the House
provision with respect to consumer representa-

6

-

tion. The purpose of this section is to provide
a mechanism to assure that the interests of electric consumers will be represented at the state
level in proceedings dealing with the standards
set forth in subtitle B. The mechanism chosen
for this purpose is either of two options One
makes the utility liable to provide compensation
directly to electric consumers who substantially
contribute to the approval, in whole or in part,
of a position advocated by the consumer in a
proceeding concerning the utility relating to any
standard set forth in this title by creating a
right of action against the utility. The second
option
provides
that
the
State
or
State
regulatory authority or nonregulated utility may
have a program to otherwise provide adequate
compensation to persons described in subsection
(b) . Such a program may include an adequately
funded office of public counsel which adequately
represents the interests of persons described in
paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b).
[Emphasis added] H.R. Rept. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess.,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, 7797, 7816
[hereinafter Conference Report].

The persons described in

"paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b) [of Section 122] f "
supra, are those who
represented

in

the

"would

not otherwise

proceeding,"

whose

be

adequately

representation

is

"necessary for a fair determination," and who are otherwise
"unable

to

effectively

participate

or

intervene

in

the

proceeding" because of their inability to pay the costs of
participation.

PURPA

§

122(b)(1)

and

(2); 16

U.S.C. §

2632(b)(1) and (2). These, among others, are the interests
represented

by

the Division

of Public

Utilities

and

the

Committee of Consumer Services.
As part of its comprehensive statutory scheme for the
regulation of public utilities, the legislature of the State
of Utah has established the Division of Public Utilities and
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the Committee of Consumer Services in order to provide two
separate layers of consumer representation in public utility
regulatory matters.

The Division of Public Utilities is an

agency within the Department of Business Regulation which
has the statutory responsibility to represent the public
interest in matters and proceedings involving public utility
regulation.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-l.

The Division is

empowered to initiate investigations, commence proceedings,
file complaints, present evidence and recommendations and
generally

engage

in all activities

statutory responsibility.

consistent with its

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-l.

The

Division also has the authority to hire the economists,
accountants, engineers, inspectors, statisticians, lawyers,
law clerks and other technical and professional experts it
may

require

54-4a-3.

to perform

its duties.

Utah Code Ann. §

In addition, the State legislature has directed

the Attorney General to appoint sufficient full-time legal
counsel to assist, advise and represent the Division in the
discharge of its duties. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-4.
While the codification of the Division's duties and
authority in Utah Code Annotated § 54-4a-l is relatively
recent, this Court recognized in Utah Department of Business
Regulation v. P.S.C., 614 P2d 1242 (Utah 1980), that the
1969 legislative reorganization of the Department of Business

Regulation

direction

and

transferred

authority

to

the Division, under the

of its

those Public Service Commission

statutory

administrator,

functions which did not

- 8-

directly involve the Commission's performance as an adjudicative or deliberative body.

Thus, even prior to the

enactment of § 54-4a-l, the Division had the authority to
initiate

investigations, file complaints, participate in

hearings, appeal Commission orders and generally serve as an
advocate to assert and protect the interests of the people
of the State of Utah.

Id. at 1252-1253; Utah code Ann. §

54-4-2, 54-7-9, 54-7-12(2), 54-7-21, 54-7-24.
Pursuant to its statutory responsibility to represent
the interests of the people of the State of Utah, including
Appellants' own constituency

of

low income

and elderly

consumers, the Division of Public Utilities appeared in the
proceedings

before

the

Public

Service

Commission.

The

Division presented evidence to the Commission on several
topics including: the requirements of PURPA; the provisions
of the PURPA termination of service standard; the provisions
of the Department of Energy guidelines for consideration of
the PURPA termination standard, (including the provisions
dealing with the notice required before termination, third
party notice and protection against termination where there
is illness); the termination provisions of other states; and
the areas in which the existing Utah Commission rules did
not comply with the PURPA termination standard.
201-224).

(Tr. at

Counsel for the Division also engaged in cross

examination of witnesses and otherwise fully participated in
the hearing process.

In addition, the Division recommended

that the Commission adopt the draft rules prepared by the
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parties, including the provisions Appellants refer to on
Page 14 of their Brief.

(Tr. at 112). Thus, the Division

not only

responsibility

fulfilled

its

to represent the

public interest, including the interests of Appellants' own
constituency, it also took a position similar to Appellants'
position on the proposed rules.
Notwithstanding, Appellants insist that the participation of the Division of Public Utilities in the proceedings
did not constitute an "alternative means" for the representation of consumers because the Division "cannot represent
consumer interests."

(Brief of Appellants, p. 11). Since

the Division has the statutory duty to represent the interests of consumers, and indeed represented consumer interests
in the subject proceeding, Appellants are apparently arguing
that

the

Division

must

represent

only

Appellants' own

constituency in order to suffice as an "alternative means"
of representation.
Since an office of public counsel, as contemplated in
the legislative history of PURPA, would necessarily have the
mandate to represent all elements of the public who would
not otherwise be heard, Appellants argument is incorrect.
Indeed the Washington Supreme Court rejected that argument
in Power v Washington Water Power Co., 662 P2d 374 (Wash.
1983).

(R. at 194-201).

In that case, the Washington court rejected the argument that each segment of the public was entitled to separate

representation

and

held

that
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a

special

assistant

attorney general appointed to represent the people of the
State of Washington was an appropriate "alternative means"
of representation within the requirements of PURPA.
Washington court also set out several criteria

The

for the

determination of what type of public counsel meets the PURPA
requirements:
To meet the requirements of PURPA, public
counsel must be: (1) independent of the state's
regulatory authority; (2) empowered to appear and
participate
in any
regulatory
or
judicial
proceeding;
(3) authorized to retain outside
experts and consultants in particular cases; and
(4) authorized to hire and retain sufficient
staff. . . .
We point out, however, that the scope of this
representation is subject to the limitation of 16
U.S.C. § 2632(b)(1). The attorney general in
providing alternative means is not required to
represent the views of those consumers whose
position is otherwise adequately represented.
Accord, Re Costs of Participation in Elec.
Ratemaking Proceedings, 37 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 259
(Cal. P.U.C. 1980); Re Costs of Participation in
Comm'n Proceedings on PURPA, 37 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th 280, 283, (Me. P.U.C. 1980). Furthermore,
only that representation necessary for a "fair
determination in the proceeding" (16 U.S.C.S
2632(b)(1)(B) is required. Power, supra, at 378.
Since the Division of Public Utilities has the requisite independence and authority to meet the criteria
established by the Washington Supreme Court, it is clear
that the Division constitutes an "alternative means" for the
representation of consumers under PURPA.

However, the State

legislature has also established the Committee of Consumer
Services to provide another separate layer of representation
for residential and small commercial consumers.
The Committee of Consumer Services is a separate agency
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within

the Division

specific

of

responsibility

Public

Utilities which

to assist residential

has the

and small

commercial consumers in appearing before the Public Service
Commission and to serve as the "advocate on its own behalf
and in its own name, of positions most advantageous to a
majority

of residential

consumers

as determined

by the

committee and those engaged in small commercial enterprises
. . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 54-10-4 (1) , (2) and (3). The

Committee consists of a six member policy-making board whose
members must include one low income resident, one retired
person,

one

small

commercial

consumer,

rancher, and one residential consumer.
54-10-2.

one

farmer

or

Utah Code Ann. §

The directives of the Committee are carried out by

the Committee staff, with the assistance of an attorney
appointed by the Attorney General's office.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 54-10-5; § 54-10-7.
The Committee of Consumer Services, like the Division
of Public Utilities, has the statutory

independence and

authority to meet the requirements set out by the Washington
Supreme Court for an "alternative means'1 of representation
under PURPA.

As an appointed citizen board with the power

to establish its own policies and procedures, the Committee
is independent of both the Public Service Commission and the
Division of Public Utilities.
seq.

Utah Code Ann. § 54-10-1 et

In addition, the Committee has the statutory authority

to appear and participate in any regulatory or judicial
proceeding and to hire experts and staff.
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Utah Code Ann. §

54-10-4, 54-10-5, 54-10-7;
members of the Committee
hearings.

(R. at 11).

(R. at 5, 10).

Indeed, two

staff were present during the

Thus, the State of Utah has provided

two "alternative means" of representation for consumers.
Despite the fact that the Committee has the statutory
duty

and

authority

commercial

to

consumers,

consumers, Appellants

represent

including
contend

residential
low

income

and
and

small

elderly

that the Committee cannot

constitute an "alternative means" of consumer representation
because the Committee is not authorized to award consumer
compensation.

(Brief of Appellant, p. 11).

Appellants1

contention is not supported by the provisions of PURPA or
the language of the statute which established the Committee.
The legislative history accompanying § 122 of PURPA
makes clear that the purpose of § 122 is to "assure that the
interests of electric consumers will be represented at the
State level in proceedings dealing with the standards set
forth in subtitle B."
to accomplish

Conference Report, supra.

that purpose, PURPA

§

In order

122 provides that

consumers must be reimbursed for their costs of participation in proceedings, unless the state has established an
"alternative

means"

consumer interests.

for

assuring

the

representation

16 U.S.C. § 2632(a).

of

The PURPA § 122

legislative history explicitly proffers, as one example of
an alternative means for the representation of electric
consumers, an "adequately funded office of public counsel
which adequately represents "the interests of those electric

- 13 -

consumers."

Conference Report, supra.

There is no PURPA

requirement that an office of public counsel, in order to
constitute an alternative means of representation, must both
represent

consumers

themselves.

and

pay

consumers

to

represent

Indeed, if such a requirement were to be read

into PURPA, the people of the State of Utah would be
required to pay for the same service at least three times;
once to fund the Division of Public Utilities, once to fund
the Committee

of Consumer

consumer participation.

Services, and

again

to fund

(See Part A 2 infra).

Even if § 122 of PURPA could be interpreted to require
intervenor compensation when an office of public counsel has
already been established to provide an alternative means of
representation, the State * legislature has authorized the
Committee of Consumer Services to provide assistance to
consumers who wish to participate in Public Service Commission

proceedings.

mandated

that

the

Indeed,

the

Committee

State

"shall

legislature

assist

has

residential

consumers and those engaged in small commercial enterprises
in appearing before the public service commission of the
state of Utah."

Utah Code Ann. § 54-10-4(2).

Thus, the

State of Utah has not only established two alternative means
for

assuring

representation

of

consumers, it

has

also

provided a means for assisting consumers to present their
views to the Commission.
Pursuant to its statutory responsibility to represent
the interests of residential and small commercial consumers,
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the Committee of Consumer Services appeared in the proceedings before the Public Service Commission.

The Committee

was represented by Assistant Attorney General James Barker.
Mr. Barker has been a member of the Utah Bar since 1954, and
has served

in a variety

of official capacities in his

professional life, including Salt Lake City Judge, Salt Lake
City Commissioner, and Salt Lake City Attorney.
170) .

(R. at

Mr. Barker has appeared before the Commission on

numerous occasions.

(R. at 170-171).

It is Mr. Barker's

opinion that he did a reasonable job advocating the interests of his client.

(R. at 172).

It is Mr. Barker's

opinion that he was empowered to participate in the proceedings, as well as appeals, and that there were no formal or
informal
Committee.

restrictions

on

his

representation

of

the

(R. at 172). Mr. Barker's representation of the

Committee was independent of the Public Service Commission
and the Division of Public Utilities

(R. at 172) .

Mr.

Barker, as attorney for the Committee, had the ability to
present his own witnesses, if he thought it desirable, and
he had adequate funding to hire expert witnesses in gas and
electric cases.

(R. at 167).

Appellants, in their Brief, characterize the Committee's participation in the hearings before the Commission as
passive.

(Brief of Appellants, p. 12) .

However, that is

hardly a fair characterization of Mr. Barker's contribution
to the proceedings.

Mr. Barker fully participated in the

hearing process and, in so doing, he served as a forceful
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advocate through cross examination of positions similar to
Appellants.

(Tr. at 22-25, 67-72).

In addition, Mr. Barker

assisted a member of the board of the Utah State Coalition
of Senior Citizens, an Appellant in this case, in presenting
his statement to the Commission and raised objections to the
testimony presented by utility witnesses.
154, 357-359).

(Tr. at 237-238,

Thus, the Committee, like the Division,

adequately represented the interests of consumers in the
proceedings before the Public Service Commission*

2.

THE COSTS OF PARTICIPATION OF
THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
AND THE COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES
WERE UNDERWRITTEN BY RESPONDENT,
AND ULTIMATELY ITS RATEPAYERS.

As a public utility subject to the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Commission, Respondent is required to pay a
special fee which is determined each year by the Department
of Business Regulation and the Public Service Commission.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-5-1.5.
assure

that

Respondent

The purpose of this fee is to

and

the

other

public

utilities

provide "all of the funds for the administration, support
and maintenance of the public service commission and state
agencies

within

the

department

of

business

regulation

involved in the regulation of public utilities, including
expenditures
lation...11.
ultimately

by

the attorney

general

Utah Code Ann. § 54-5-1.5.
shouldered

by

Respondent's

for utility reguSince this fee is
ratepayers,

the

ratepayers pay the administrative and support costs of the
- 16 -

Division of Public Utilities and the Committee of Consumer
Services, including the costs of providing legal counsel for
both agencies and the costs of hiring the consultants and
witnesses either agency may decide to employ.
Appellants cite the decision of the California Public
Utilities

Commission

in

Re

Costs

of

Participation

in

Ratemaking Proceedings, 37 P.U.R. 4th 259 (1980)f as support
for the proposition that neither the Division of Public
Utilities, nor the Committee

of Consumer

Services can

provide an "alternative means" for public representation
within the meaning of PURPA.
10-11).

(Brief of Appellants, p.

In so doing, Appellants

cull

language

in the

decision that "(a)ny staff would be hard pressed to represent all of these interests adequately."

(Brief of Appel-

lants, p. 10). Appellants fail, however, to mention the
further pronouncement of the California Commission in the
same decision relating to the prerequisites for intervenor
funding:
Nevertheless, in order to avoid burdensome exactions upon the public, we conclude that a
consumer is not eligible for compensation for
presenting the same evidence on the same issues as
the staff. In order to be eligible for compensation, a consumer must raise a different issue,
present or elicit new or different evidence, or
take a different position from that of the staff.
. . . Above all, the citizens of the state should
not be required to pay twice for the same services, once as taxpayers (to fund the staff's
participation), and again as ratepayers (to fund a
consumer's participation).
(Emphasis supplied)

37 P.U.R. 4th at 265-266.
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The Maine

Public

Utilities

Commission

in Costs of

Participation in Commission Proceedings on PURPA, 37 P.U.R.
4th 280 (Me. P.U.C. 1980), also expressed concern about the
expenditure of ratepayer monies and adopted procedures to
prevent ratepayers from being charged twice for the costs of
public representation.

The Maine Commission stated:

No consumer shall be entitled to an award of
compensation for advocating any position in a
commission proceeding relating to a PURPA issue if
the commission determines that position is the
same or similar to the position advocated in the
proceeding by any agency or organization funded in
whole or in part by state or federal money.
Id. at 283.
The prospect of ratepayers paying twice for public
representation, a prospect only alluded to by the California
and Maine Commissions, becomes very real in the context of
the proceedings before the Public Service Commission in case
no. 79-999-02. Indeed, as noted previously, Respondent, and
hence its ratepayers, is already underwriting, through its
funding of the Division of Public Utilities and the Committee of Consumer Services, the costs of public participation
in those Commission proceedings.

If intervenor reimburse-

ment of Appellants' attorney fees is ordered, Respondent's
ratepayers will be required, for yet a third time, to pay
for the costs of public participation.

In addition, to the

extent Appellants or their counsel receive federal or state
funding, Respondent's ratepayers face the prospect of paying
twice

for

Appellants'

costs

of

participation;

- 18 -

once

as

ratepayers, if intervenor compensation is ordered, and once
as taxpayers.
Not only do Respondent's ratepayers face the prospect
of repeatedly paying the costs of public participation in
the subject Commission

proceedings, they

also

face the

prospect, if reimbursement of Appellants1 attorneys fees is
ordered, of paying that portion of Appellants1 costs which
should

be borne by

other

state utilities.

During the

proceedings before the Commission, Empire Electric Association, C. P. National and Moon Lake Electric Association
entered appearances through their respective counsel.

The

Report and Interim Order of the Commission specifically
provided that the modifications to the Commission's rules
applied to both Moon Lake Electric and C. P. National.

(R.

at 75). Despite these facts, Appellants seek to impose the
entire cost of their participation on the ratepayers of
Respondent.
In summary, "alternative means," in the form of the
Division of Public Utilities and the Committee of Consumer
Services, were provided

for

"assuring

representation of

electric consumers," as contemplated by § 122(a) of PURPA.
The Division and the Committee adequately represented the
interests of electric consumers in the subject proceeding,
including the interests of Appellants' own constituency

—

were that not the case, Respondent submits that it was
wrongfully assessed the regulatory fees which underwrote the
costs for those agencies to appear and represent the public.
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Accordingly, Respondent should not be required, yet again,
to underwrite the costs of public participation
proceedings before the Commission.

In addition, there is no

provision of PURPA or any other statutory
consideration

which

would

in the

require

or equitable

Respondent

and

its

ratepayers to pay the entire cost of Appellants' participation, as Appellants would have them do, when there were
three other state electric utilities involved in and concerned with the subject proceedings.

B.

APPELLANTS' FAILED TO APPEAL THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER
DENYING AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS" FEES
AND APPELLANTS' NOW SEEK TO COLLATERALLY
ATTACK THAT COMMISSION ORDER.

On May 25, 1982, Appellants filed a motion with the
Public Service Commission requesting an award of attorney
fees for their participation in the proceedings before the
Commission,

On July 13, 1982, the Commission issued an

order denying Appellants' request.

The Commission stated:

Mr. Plenk's Motion was not filed until 20 months
after the proceedings were closed for purposes of
offering evidence and presenting arguments. The
Motion was not submitted in a timely manner,
making it impossible for the Commission to establish procedures for evaluating the merits of his
claim or for determining the amount of such fees
and making it impossible for the Commission to
include an award of attorneys1 fees in the Orders
entered in these proceedings. Accordingly, the
Motion for Attorneys1 Fees should be denied.
The appropriate forum for consideration of the correctness of this order is the Utah Supreme Court.
Annotated § 54-7-16 provides:
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Utah Code

. , . No court of this state (except the Supreme
Court to the extent herein specified) shall have
jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct or annul
any order or decision of the commission, or to
suspend ox delay the execution or operation
thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere with
the commission in the performance of its official
duties; provided, that the writ of mandamus shall
be from the Supreme Court to the commission in all
proper cases.
Thus, since Appellants ' chose the Pub] i c Service Commission
a

e f- ::: i urn i i 1 i ; 1 :i :i • ::::]l: i tc j: i 11: si le tl: lei i: c -Il a :i m cif a ,,,t tor i ley s

fees, the Appellants" relief from, the Commission's order I s
solely through an appea] to this Court

Appe 11 ants fai 1 ed

to appea ] the Commissi oi i ! s • : J : der ai i :I I: .1 iej si lould be pi: ecJ i idee
from, c o l l a t e r a l l y a t t a c k i n g that order

N o r t h Salt Lake v

S t , Joseph. W a t e r & I r r . C o . , 223 P. 2d 577 (01: , ] 95 0)
Appel lants argue that: a. c:i v i 1 act :il oi I i s appropriate i n
this

case because

the

make direct awards...

Pub 1 i c Se rvi ce Commi s s ion. doe s not

(Brief of Appe.,1 lants ,- j: • 6-7)

However,

thei e i s i v :: pi: oi louncemei it 1: ;;r tl le I i ib„3 i c Service C Dinmissd on
t h a t it wi 11 n o t m a k e d i r e c t a w a r d s in an a p p r o p r i a t e c a s e ,
I n d e e d , the o r d e r
c e e d i i i g in e i: e ] y

from,, the C o m m i s si on j n the sub j ect p r o i e K e a 3 s 11: :t a 1: A p p e 2 3 a i l I: s ! £ a 1 3 u r €

!:: • :: • 1: :i in, e J y

file their r e q u e s t d e n i e d the Commission, an a d e q u a t e o p p o r tuni ty

to e x e r c i se

sibili 1: .ies

tc

its

s tate

pi: o tec I: tl le

and PURPA
ra tepay ei: s

s t a, tutory
f r om

re s p o n -

wa .stefu]

c J: id

u n n e c e s s a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s o f their m o n i e s and to assure that
the i n t e r e s t s o f c o n s u m e r s are a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d ,
Evei i a • ::::i:i,,:i:: sor } i e i i e% ::: f tl i„e i e cox d i i: :t„ the p r o c e e d i n g s
b e f o r e the C o m m i s s i o n m a k e s the reasons for the C o m m i s s i o n ' s
denial of attorneys1

fees

apparent.
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The proceedings

were

initiated by Appellants1 petition for a moratorium on winter
termination of utility service and for rulemaking to establish rules regarding winter termination of utility service.
The Commission expanded the scope of the proceedings to
include the consideration of the PURPA standard for termination of service.

(R. at 11) .

The Commission was required

by PURPA to consider that standard and had already reported
to the Department of Energy that the PURPA termination
standard would be considered.

16 U.S.C. § 2623 (a), (b)(4);

(Tr. at 228-229); (R. at 73).
Following three days of public hearings, the Commission
denied Appellants' motion and issued an Interim Order which
directed the parties to meet in committee and draft a set of
proposed regulations for Commission review.

(R. at 108).

Subsequently, two days of public hearings were held to
consider the draft regulations.

(Tr. at 108). During the

hearings before the Commission, four electric utilities, two
gas utilities, the Committee of Consumer Services and the
Division of Public Utilities entered appearances.

(Tr. at

1, 2, 197). In addition, various public witnesses presented
testimony to the Commission.

(Tr. at 237, 241, 247, 302).

Out of this process, a process which lasted some ten months,
came several revisions to the Commission's rules on termination of service.
It is hardly surprising that, some twenty months after
the

close

of

the proceedings, the Commission

found it

impossible to prepare procedures and retroactively determine
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whether

Appellant?

had

m i s s i o n 1 ? decisir-r..
y- .

-

mac?-"

contribution

Howev-: , A p p e l l a n t
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another
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Com
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CONCLUSION
rriKn
are

net

cour

t below was correct in deciding that Appella-'

entitled

to

an

award

r e s p e c t f u 1 1 "," I.,I i "VJ :! ' I"1 "it
the

court

below,

awarding

of

attorne-y c J

I li i '"« *.'< MIL I
summary-

Respondent.
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fees.

1*

a I L i i HI it I!: 1 le dec . r .
judgment

i :i:i favor

DATED this 21st day of November, 1984.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT GORDON
EDWARD HUNTER
Attorneys for Respondent,
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
P. 0. Box 899
1407 West North Temple
Suite 339
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two (2) copies of Respondent's
Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Bruce Plenk, Attorney
for Appellants, at Utah Legal Services, Inc., 637 East 400
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this 21st day of
November, 1984.
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